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CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY: UN PEACEKEEPING, NATO, AND THE UDHR AT 70
This panel was convened at 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, March 28, 2019, by its moderator Diane
Marie Amann of the University of Georgia School of Law, who introduced the panelists: Steven
Hill of the NATO Ofﬁce of Legal Affairs; Michael Doyle of Columbia University; Bruce Oswald
of the University of Melbourne Law School; and Rita Siemion of Human Rights First.

COLD WAR I, POST-C OLD WAR, AND COLD WAR II: THE O VERARCHING C ONTEXTS
FOR P EACEKEEPING , H UMAN R IGHTS , AND NATO
By Michael Doyle*
Peacekeeping, human rights, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have ﬂourished in complementary contrast with each other. Their relationship has reﬂected the constraints
and opportunities provided by three geopolitical eras since World War II. The ﬁrst (the ﬁrst Cold
War) began in about 1948 and lasted until 1988; the second (the Post-Cold War Liberal Primacy)
ran from 1989 to around 2012; ﬁnally, since 2012 the world has been threatened with the
emergence of a second Cold War.
During the ﬁrst geopolitical era, NATO was the centerpiece of the Western Cold War alliance.
However, its importance declined when the Cold War waned. Thereafter, during the Post-Cold War
liberal primacy, human rights and peacekeeping ﬂourished. In our current geopolitical era, both
human rights and peacekeeping are under stress, yet it is not clear that these new forces are
strengthening NATO.

COLD WAR I
Human rights as established in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), peacekeeping, and NATO were all born between 1948 and 1949. The ﬁrst two preceded, and the last
directly reﬂected, an escalating Cold War.
The Cold War was a warlike conﬂict aiming at defeat, “burial,” but not by military conquest. Hot
war between the U.S.-led West and Soviet-led East was deterred ﬁrst by the power of conventional
arsenals and subsequently by the weight of nuclear deterrence. Instead, the United States and
USSR competed with each other through proxy wars in East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America and through industrial rivalry, covert action, propaganda campaigns, and cultural
struggle. The Cold War was comprised of a threefold, multidimensional, mutually reinforcing
rivalry: ﬁrst, a bipolar international system; second, competition between capitalist and communist
economic systems; and third, contestation between two political ideologies—liberal democracy
and communist dictatorship.

* Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs and Columbia Law School. I thank Nathan Feldman for
his assistance and suggestions in preparing this draft.
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The UDHR was endorsed in 1948, just as the era of the World War II “United Nations” alliance
was fading and Cold War tensions were rising. It reﬂected many ideologies: Western liberalism and
social democracy; Global Southern developmentalism; and Soviet Communism. Eleanor
Roosevelt’s social democracy, John Peters Humphrey’s liberalism, and Charles Malik and Rene
Cassin’s cultural humanism kept these ideologies together enough to produce the UDHR amalgam.
The UDHR passed in 1948 with no negative votes, forty-eight positive, but with nine abstentions
(including the USSR, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and—for obvious reasons—South Africa and Saudi Arabia). This soon produced divisions on human rights, with
the West sponsoring civic and political rights and the East social and economic rights—all of which
had been united in the UDHR.
A multilateral stalemate between East and West at the United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) also limited the scope of peacekeeping. “First generation” peacekeeping emerged
in 1948, designed to launch interpositions between warring parties. However, its reach was
limited to the few conﬂicts that both the United States and the USSR wanted to isolate, and
its functions were limited to monitoring truces—with the notable exceptions of the UN
Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
On the other hand, NATO, created in 1949, directly reﬂected and ﬂourished in the Cold War. It
was not merely a military alliance, as suggested by its preamble, which stipulated that:
The Parties to this Treaty … reafﬁrm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of
the United Nations and are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the
rule of law.
The Cold War stimulated, reinforced, and gave shape to NATO’s confrontation with the Warsaw
Pact across Europe, which was replicated and mirrored in numerous regional conﬂicts and in the
alphabet soup of alliances including the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

P OST-C OLD WAR
The Cold War ended with Gorbachev’s loosening of the restraints on Eastern Europe: the famous
“Sinatra Doctrine” (each country could now do it “my way”); his announcement that open democracy was the crucial foundation of genuine socialism (1985 Party Congress Speech); and, most
strikingly, his announcement that human rights were not Western, but were rather “human values,”
owned and acknowledged by all human beings.1 The end of the Cold War was reinforced by movement toward glasnost and perestroika in the USSR and ultimately secured with its collapse in 1991.
After the Cold War, human rights doctrines ﬂourished; with the highpoint being the Vienna
Declaration’s consensus that human rights are “universal, indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated”—rhetorically amalgamating civic and political rights with their economic and social counterparts. Similarly, with the Agenda for Peace (1992), peacekeeping ﬂourished with a rapid
escalation in the number and depth of missions. This included the move from First Generation
ceaseﬁre monitoring to Second Generation multidimensional peacebuilding and Third
Generation peace enforcement (including the protection of civilians). Before 1988, there were thirteen Peacekeeping Operations (an average of just over three per decade), and between 1988 to
2010 there were ﬁfty-three (twenty-six per decade).

1
Gorbachev Address to the United Nations General Assembly (Dec. 7, 1988), available at https://www.c-span.org/video/
?5292-1/gorbachev-united-nations.
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While human rights and peacekeeping operations blossomed, NATO entered a period of identity
crisis. It had been designed to deter the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and to stop the spread of
communism. What should it do once these threats were gone? Indeed, many scholars of international relations predicted its rapid demise.
NATO, however, did not die. Rather it expanded in numbers and evolved by undertaking new
roles, including peacekeeping in the Balkans and then peace enforcement in Afghanistan.
Institutions rarely do die. The United States still has two powerful regiments called cavalry, though
now they ride helicopters and armoured personnel carriers. But NATO budgets did decline and
readiness slipped.

N EW COLD WAR ?
Since 2012—the year of Vladimir Putin’s return to the Russian presidency and Xi Jinping’s
ascendancy in China, both of which sparked alarm in the United States and Europe—we have
seen the reemergence of global rivalry. These phenomena can be understood as the potential development of a second Cold War.2
The West is alarmed by cyberthreats. U.S., UK, and French intelligence services all agree that
Putin waged a concerted campaign to intervene in U.S., French, and British elections and referenda
in 2016. It is widely assumed that this cyberwarfare was undertaken with the intention of tilting
elections toward right-wing candidates or with the purpose of discrediting democracy itself. China
is seen as a geostrategic power rival by the United States—one that might replace it—and is deeply
engaged in industrial espionage and technology theft. This new level of tension is characteristic of
a revolutionary, legitimacy conﬂict.
Russia has acted aggressively because it resents its eclipse since the 1990s and because it is fearful of democratic upheavals encouraged from abroad, tilting former allies toward NATO and
impinging upon its sphere of inﬂuence. In particular, it has been concerned by the “color” revolutions, which have toppled pro-Russian oligarchies in Ukraine and Georgia. China feels that it is
being contained by the United States.
Both China and Russia have experienced the emergence of autocracy and hypernationalism
which put an internal premium on external conﬂict (whether focused on Ukraine or the South
China Sea) as a way to gin up nationalist support and reinforce autocracy by discrediting local
internationalist voices.
Moreover, the tension between Russia and China, on the one hand, and the United States, on
the other, are also the result of deep institutional differences between them. Russia and China
are Corporatist Nationalist Autocracies (CNAs) which are aligned with remaining communist
states—North Korea and Cuba—and clients such as Venezuela. Conversely, the United States
(as well as other allies, such as the United Kingdom, Western Europe, and Japan) are liberal
capitalist democracies. (By “liberal,” I do not mean that they are left-leaning politically but rather
classically liberal, ranging from social democracy to libertarian: in the U.S. case, from Bernie
Sanders to Paul Ryan.)
Importantly, this burgeoning second Cold War is not as extreme as its predecessor. Neither
Russia nor China is as implacably hostile as the USSR or PRC were during the Cold War.
There are areas of common interest between current actors. The United States and China both
worry about the nuclearization of North Korea; the European Union and China are both troubled
by climate change; the United States, European Union, and Russia are connected in efforts
2
I plan to address these themes in my forthcoming book: C OLD P EACE . What follows in this section draws from
arguments that are more thoroughly developed there.
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against Islamic State terrorism. Moreover, all these actors are much more economically interdependent than during the original Cold War, and tensions between them are thus much more
costly.
An odd dynamic of the second Cold War is that the United States is a liberal capitalist democracy,
but current U.S. President Donald Trump is not a liberal in the usual sense of that word. Although
its government is democratic and capitalist, Trump endorses torture and trafﬁcs in the rhetoric of
violence and white nationalism.3 He is much closer to the views of Putin (and many other hypernationalists such as Victor Orbán, Rodrigo Duterte, and Jair Bolsonaro) than previous or current
liberal leaders.
Human rights have come under attack by all sides. The combination of rising Cold War style
tensions and Trump’s illiberalism have greatly harmed the human rights project. The United
States has withdrawn from the United Nations Human Rights Council. China’s recent action
against the Uighurs and Putin’s attack against freedom of speech (criticism of state and government
is now illegal) have been both condemned by the European Union Parliament.
A commitment to peacekeeping has also been collateral damage of escalating tensions. There
have been only ﬁve peacekeeping operations launched since 2012, and because of Russian and
Chinese vetoes, the UNSC has been AWOL on Syria.
One might thus expect that NATO, as during the ﬁrst Cold War, should now be reviving.
However, although European and Canadian defense expenditure, after falling during the Great
Recession, sharply revived in 2014, NATO too may be in crisis. NATO is now subject to deep
divisions between its Western European members and the United States. To quote two prominent
diplomats, Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute:
The single greatest challenge NATO faces today is the critical need for reviving strong,
reliable American leadership…. At the most basic level, the next American president must
reafﬁrm U.S. commitment to the Alliance, especially the Article 5 collective defense pledge,
in both words and deeds. Given the opportunity to do so within months of his inauguration in
May 2017, President Trump refused to honor the U.S. commitment to Article 5, even while
unveiling a memorial at the new NATO headquarters commemorating its historic invocation
after 9/11.4
Ironically, then, the New Cold War seems to be producing problematic prospects for all three pillars
of post-World War II international order. Peacekeeping operations and human rights are harmed by
the new Cold War rivalry, while NATO is damaged by Trump’s presidency.
3
Previous U.S. administrations sometimes engaged in torture while denying that what they were doing was “torture.”
See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, Law in a Time of Emergency: States of Exception and the Temptations of 9/11, 6 U.
PENN. J. CONST. L. 1001 (2004).
4
Nicholas Burns & Douglas Lute, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis 13 (Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Report, Feb. 2019).
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